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ABSTRACT
IMPRESSION FORMATION IN AN INTERGROUP SETTING:
THE EFFECTS OF OUTGROUP POWER AND HOMOGENEITY
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M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
A central feature of stratified societies is the
unequal partition of power between its members. Of
fundamental importance for social psychology is the
question of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
consequences of perceived power differentials, especially
from the perspective of the powerless. As indicated by
literature reviews, this issue has, however, been largely
neglected. One reason for this lacuna may be a confused
definition of the concept: social power should be
distinguished from social influence and social status and
may rather be defined in terms of outcome control. Because
a sense of control over one's outcomes is central to the
self-concept, the question of power becomes: how will the
powerless cope with a threat to their sense of control? As
suggested by research on impression formation, one strategy
may be to individuate the ones in power, i.e. to pay
particular attention to their idiosyncratic attributes, in
an effort to gain indirect outcome control.
iii
A first experiment investigated the effects of
outgroup power and outgroup homogeneity on the formation of
impressions of outgroup members, in a minimal group
paradigm. As predicted, results indicate that outgroup
power affected subjects' feeling of control, and led them
to engage in more individuating impression formation
processes, but only when the ones in power were perceived
as a collection of individuals to begin with (heterogeneous
condition)
.
This individuating effect of power did not
occur when the ones in power were perceived as a salient
outgroup (homogeneous condition) . Results are discussed in
light of the continuum model of impression formation. The
differential impact of perceived power, depending of its
social categorization, opens fascinating perspectives on
intergroup relation processes.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many philosophers and social scientists have argued
that power should be the focus of social sciences; to
quote Bertrand Russell (1938, p lo) : "i shall be concerned
to prove that the fundamental concept in social sciences is
Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental
concept in Physics." As a matter of fact, the central
feature of stratified societies is the unequal partition of
power among its members: social control (which is
essential to society) presupposes a power structure for the
differentiated application of sanctions (Dahrendorf
,
1968)
.
In other words, the fact that some individuals are in a
structural position to evaluate and sanction the behavior
of other individuals is a keystone of social functioning.
If indeed power is a central aspect of social interactions,
a crucial problem for psychologists is the question of the
psychological consequences of power differentials in
interpersonal and intergroup relations. Of particular
interest to the understanding of social change processes is
the issue of cognitive, emotional and behavioral
consequences of perceived power differentials from the
point of view of the powerless.
The present thesis is an attempt at understanding how
people form impressions of powerful others. Do people tend
2to individualize and pay particular attention to the ones
in power, perceiving them as a collection of
"personalities"? or on the contrary, do they categorize
them quickly as "the bosses"? After discussing some issues
on social power, psychological control, and impression
formation processes, I shall present the results of an
experiment investigating, in an intergroup setting, the
effects of outgroup power and homogeneity on forming
impressions of outgroup members.
CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL POWER: CIRCUMSCRIBING THE CONCEPT
A number of psychologists have insisted on the
importance of power to the understanding of human
interactions. As Sik Hung Ng (1980, p 254) stated it:
"The conditions under which human beings live are to a
large extent shaped by the social arrangement of power
which therefore should not be left out of social
psychology." Surprisingly, however, the power variable
remains largely absent from empirical research. Power is
still a "neglected variable" in social psychology
(Cartwright, 1959), and may be the most neglected aspect of
small group research (Sherif, 1962). Many authors have
pointed out that much of the experimental work on
intergroup relations has ignored the question of power
(e.g., Apfelbaum, 1979a, 1979b; Billig, 1976; Brown, 1988;
Condor and Brown, 1986; Deschamps, 1982; Hogg and Abrams,
1988; Ng, 1980, 1982; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985). A
widespread feeling among researchers is that the "reality"
of power cannot be easily simulated in laboratory settings
(e.g., Hollander, 1985). But what is this "reality" of
power? I want to argue here that the lack of research on
power is partly due to a confused definition of the
concept.
3
4Power as Social influf^nr.f^
Among sociologists, the concept of power proves to be
compelling yet troublesome. it is often used in a very
broad sense, presenting many faces, and therefore
condemning any attempt at a single general answer to the
question. in Bierstedt's terms (1950, p 730): "in the
entire lexicon of social concepts none is more troublesome
than the concept of power. We may say about it only what
St. Augustine said about time, that we all know perfectly
what it is until someone asks us" (see also Kaufman and
Jones, 1954; Parenti, 1978; for a review see Lukes, 1986).
Psychologists have encountered the same difficulty in
dealing with the concept of power, used in some overlapping
and contradictory ways (Turner, 1991; for a review see Ng,
1980)
.
However, most of them seem to have chosen to define
power in terms of influence, or even to use the terms
interchangeably (Hollander, 1985) . In so doing they
adopted a philosophical tradition conceiving of power as
the production of intended effects (Russell, 1938) or the
capacity to produce them (Weber, 1947) . Indeed, most of
the definitions of power proposed by social psychologists
refer to the ability to exert interpersonal influence to a
point where the concepts appear to be synonymous. In the
tradition of field theory, power is conceived as the
potential for effecting changes in the world (Lewin, 1951) .
One would then say that A has power over B when A can get B
5
to do something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957)
or when A has the capacity to influence B in a direction
desired by A (Pruitt, 1976). social power would be the
potential to direct the behavior of another person more so
than the other way around (Mulder, 1977) . m this
tradition, power is a construct which accounts for the
portion of influence that is under the actor's control:
"Power refers to the ability to achieve ends through
influence" (Huston, 1983, p 170; see also Cartwright, 1959;
Hersey and Blanchard, 1982; Lippitt et al., 1952; Veroff,
1957; Willis and Levine, 1976; Winter, 1973; Wrong, 1979).
Power is measured as the amount of successful influence
(Lippitt et al., 1952; Mayhew et al., 1969; Peplau, 1979;
Strodbeck, 1951; Szinovacz, 1981), so the many bases of
power described by psychologists (French & Raven, 1959;
Hinkin and Shriesham, 1989; Kelman, 1961; Raven and
Kruglanski, 1970; Staheski et al., 1989; Tedeschi et al.,
1972) are in fact bases of influence.
Together with this conception of power as influence,
many psychologists seem to have adopted Nietzsche's (1968)
assumption of a fundamental "will to power" in human beings
(e.g., Adler, 1966; McClelland, 1975; Mulder, 1977;
Winter, 1973) . However, considering the negative
connotations of power (Ng, 1980) as well as the costs of
power (responsibility) , it is not clear whether people are
systematically motivated to influence, or be in a position
6
to influence others. More clear is that people dislike,
resent and seek to avoid attempts by other to influence
them.
In any cases, to equate power with influence leads one
to consider power as a process or a consequence, but not as
a determinant of social interactions (hence, a lack of
empirical studies manipulating power as an independent
variable)
.
Such an approach does not account for power as
a structural aspect of organized societies. Nor does it
answer the question of the psychological consequences of
perceived power differentials. in order to do so, it is
necessary to differentiate the concept of social power from
that of social influence: power can lead to influence, but
not systematically, and influence can have other bases than
power (see Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 1991).
Power as Social Status
Willing to integrate individual and societal levels of
analysis, psychologists interested in intergroup relations
have attempted to understand how individuals' cognitions,
emotions, and behaviors influence and are influenced by
relations between groups. They conceived of society as a
stratification of social groups that stand in power,
status, and prestige relation to one another (Hogg and
Abrams, 1988) . Social Identity theorists then assumed
that, given a need for self-esteem, people are motivated to
establish favorable intergroup comparisons between their
7
group and other groups (see Brewer, 1979; Taj fel and
Turner, 1979, 1986). By doing so (e.g., discriMinating
against outgroups)
,
they can reach or maintain a positive
social identity.
Clearly, the focus of this approach to intergroup
behavior is on group status. The question of power,
however, has been rather quickly handled by assimilating
power to status: power has been implicitly conceived as
one of the valued attributes in the process of intergroup
comparison. To my mind a confusion between power and
status would jeopardize any attempt at understanding the
specific effects of perceived power. Indeed, some data
have indicated that power's connotation is negative (Ng,
1980) or that it does not correlate with self-esteem
(Kipnis, 1972). People seem to have ambivalent feelings
(composed of admiration and suspicion) toward the ones in
power. Furthermore, there exist instances where power and
status positions within a social structure are discrepant
(Lenski, 1984) . For example, although scientists have
often more prestige than politicians, the latter have more
power than the former. It is therefore necessary to
consider power and status as different factors in the study
of intergroup relations (Ng, 1980, 1982; Nigro and Serine,
1985; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985, 1991).
A few empirical studies have then started to
investigate the effects of group power on intergroup
8
discrimination (Ng, 1982; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985,1991).
In these experiments, group power, the independent
variable, was operationalized as the amount of control each
group had over the resources allocated to both groups,
while intergroup discrimination, the dependent variable,
consisted in the actual resources that subjects would
allocate to ingroup and outgroup members. Results
indicated that ingroup power increases discrimination
toward the outgroup. These results were interpreted in
terms of Social Identity Theory: The search for positive
social identity is the psychological antecedent to
discriminatory behavior and power enables group members to
discriminate effectively. Obviously, power is here reduced
to a mediating variable, a "can factor", which leads to the
rather disappointing conclusion that one discriminates when
one can. I believe that power is more than a trivial
mediating variable and has some specific psychological
impact that needs to be dealt with.
Power as Outcome Control
Approaching power as a structural aspect of social
interactions, I argued that it should be distinguished from
the concept of social influence. I also pointed out that
power cannot be assimilated with social status. I would
also argue that social power has to be defined in terms of
the relationships that bind individuals or social groups
together. From a social exchange perspective, the
9
interdependence between persons is specified by how they
control one another's outcomes which include, on one hand,
rewards and punishments and, on the other hand, costs and
benefits (Kelley, 1979). One could then say that A has
power over B when A has some control over B's outcomes.
The amount of power that A has over B would be defined by
the amount of control A has over B's outcomes (the amount
of control referring not only to the extent of control but
to the range and type of outcomes being controlled)
. A
power relation would then refer to a situation of
interdependence between social actors, whether symmetrical
or asymmetrical. But one could want to restrict the use of
power relation to refer to situations of asymmetrical
interdependence. In that case one would say that A has
power over B when A has more control over B's outcomes than
the other way around. Assuming that there is no third
party involved, the amount of power would be defined by the
amount of control A has over it's own outcomes as well as
over those of B (for such a definition of group power see
Jones, 1972; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985).
However, if one wants to convey the structural
dimension of power in stratified societies (some people
being in a position to evaluate and sanction other people)
,
it may be necessary to include the notion of role
differentiation in the definition. A power relation would
not only be characterized by asymmetrical interdependence
10
but by non-reciprocal interdependence, i.e. by dependency.
As a working definition, I shall propose here that, in a
given social situation, A has power over B when A has some
control over B's outcomes and not the other way around.
The amount of power A has over B in this situation is
defined by the amount of control that A has over B's
outcomes (extent, range, and type of outcomes affected).
One could object to this definition that, in many social
situations, the subordinates have some control over the
superiors
-outcomes as the latter depend, to a certain
extent, on the former. I would argue, however, that this
"secondary" power relation is a by-product of the primary
one which remains non-reciprocal: The secondary relation
may be perceived, or not, as a possible counter-power
depending on many "empowering" factors that are beyond the
scope of the present work. In order to avoid confusion I
shall define power as non-reciprocal outcome control.
Following this attempt to define social power, what
hypothesis can be made about cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral effects of perceived power differentials?
Whether a power relation is referred to as interdependence,
asymmetrical interdependence, or dependency, the emphasis
is on the control of outcomes. I shall therefore suggest,
in the next section, that some preliminary hypotheses can
be derived from the literature on psychological control.
CHAPTER 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTROL AND SOCIAL POWER
Control as a Basic Motivation
Many psychologists have postulated a general motive to
feel and exert control over environmental occurrences, a
sense of personal control being viewed as integral to the
self concept (Bandura, 1977; DeCharms, 1968; Fenichel,
1945; Heider, 1958; Hendrick, 1943; Kelly, 1955; White,
1959)
.
A number of cognitive theorists have suggested that
causal inferences and attributional activity arise from a
desire to render the world predictable and controllable
(Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967).
Consistent with this idea are the data showing that control
deprivation fosters attribution analyses and renders
subjects more attentive and accurate in processing
information (d'Agostino and Pittman, 1982; McCaul, 1983;
Pittman and d'Agostino, 1985; Pittman & Pittman, 1980;
Swann et al., 1981). Clearly, the new "New Look" in social
cognition, focusing on "hot cognitions", i.e. motivated
cognitions, gives particular importance to control
motivation (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 1991; Higgins and
Sorrentino, 1990; Pittman & Heller, 1987; Weary et al., in
press)
.
Apart from boosting information processing, two main
patterns of reaction to loss of control are described in
11
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the literature. The first one, reactance to perceived loss
of freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Wortxnan and
Brehm, 1975; Wicklund, 1974), is characterized by reactions
of anger, hostility, and behavioral efforts to restore
perceived freedom. Some research suggests that a threat to
a person's sense of control instigates aggression, which
can be interpreted as serving to restore perceived control
(Horwitz, 1958; McKellar, 1977; Worchel et al., 1978). The
second reaction to loss of control, learned helplessness,
arises when control-restoring efforts remain unrewarded
(Abramson, et al., 1978; Seligman, 1975). it is
characterized by a pattern of affective, cognitive, and
motivational deficits such as passivity, anxiety, and
depression. It may be that loss of control will lead to
reactance when the expectation for control is high and to
helplessness when the expectation is low (Wortman and
Brehm, 1975)
.
Control as an Adaptive Illusion
Several authors have suggested that more important
than effective control over environmental occurrences is
the belief in such control. Control may well be an
adaptive illusion (Taylor and Brown, 1988) . Indeed, people
usually tend to overestimate their degree of control over
outcomes determined by chance (Goffman, 1967; Langer, 1975;
Langer and Roth, 1975; for a review see Crocker, 1982).
They also tend to overestimate personal causation (Miller
13
leve
in
and ROSS, 1975) and favor personality as an explanation for
behavior (Ross, 1977). m short, people tend to bel
that the world is controllable (Lemer, 1970) . Hence,
an answer to Skinner's famous essay (Beyond Fr..Hn. ..h
Dignity, 1971), Lefcourt (1973) argued that whatever the
reality of control is, it is a meaningful perception for
people: while freedom and control are both illusions,
inventions of people to make sense of their experience,
they do have important behavioral consequences.
Indeed, much evidence indicates that a feeling of
control has important adaptive value, it helps in coping
with aversive events and acts as a buffer against stress
(e.g., Cohen and Edwards, in press; for a review see
Thomson, 1981) . A belief in personal control leads to
better performance and more success in tasks (e.g.,
Brunstein and Olbrich, 1985; Burger, 1985; Diener and
Dweck, 1980)
.
In fact, numerous studies suggest that a
sense of control is an important factor of mental health
and that a loss of control plays a central role in
depression (for reviews see Alloy and Abramson, 1988;
Taylor and Brown, 1988) . Most personality psychologists,
investigating individual differences in need for control
(see Matthews, 1982) and internal/external locus of control
(Rotter, 1966) , have emphasized the adaptive value of
internal sense of control (for a review see Strickland,
1989) .
14
Primary and S&cnnrj^r-y contrni
in the studies previously mentioned (describing
control as a basic motivation or adaptive illusion)
, the
notion of control is generally restricted to direct
personal control over environmental occurrences. However,
some researchers have pointed out different forms of
control (see Thomson, 1981): mainly primary control
(gaining control by influencing reality) has been
distinguished from secondary control (gaining control by
accommodating to reality)
. Although primary control is
valued in occidental cultures, and secondary control
emphasized in oriental values (individualism and autonomy
versus fit with environment and collectivism)
, one can
argue that they both reveal a need to feel in control
(Weisz et al., 1984). Among secondary forms of control is
vicarious secondary control, i.e. a tendency to align with
powerful entities in order to enhance one's sense of power
(Fromm, 1941; Hetherington and Frankie, 1967; Johnson and
Downing, 1979)
.
Other forms of secondary control include
illusory secondary control, i.e. attributing outcomes to
chance or luck as an attempt to feel allied with the forces
of fate (Kahle, 1980; Weisz, 1983), and interpretive
secondary control, i.e. changing perspective on realities
in order to get meaning from them.
Altogether, it seems reasonable to postulate in human
beings a general need to feel in control, a need that can
15
be expressed in various ways (e.g., group identification,
religious belief, etc..) when direct personal control over
environmental occurrences is not perceived as possible.
Psychol oaical Contr-oi anH p^.^.^^.
From this review of the control literature, what can
be said about the issue of social power? Remember that I
defined social power as controlling the outcomes of another
individual or group. I have suggested that people are
motivated to control their own outcomes, but it is not
clear whether people are motivated to control others'
outcomes, i.e. to have social power. Maybe social power
can be sought as a default option when one feels one cannot
have direct control over one's own outcomes. Controlling
other's outcomes, in an interdependent situation, can be an
indirect way to control one's own outcomes through social
influence. But what to say about cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral consequences of power relations for the
powerless?
Interesting data from Beauvois and Dubois (1988)
suggest that the tendency to make internal explanation of
behavior (internal attribution) and of outcomes (internal
locus of control) arises from the exercise of power.
According to them, this "norm of internality" differs among
social groups as it serves the function of justifying of
one's power position. That is, internal explanation of
behavior and outcomes justify the act of evaluating and
sanctioning others. m line with this idea one would
expect xnexobers of dominated groups, experiencing prolonged
exposure to powerlessness, to develop a low sense of
personal control. if one accept the principle of a general
motive for control, one would also expect this low sense of
personal control to be compensated by the development of
secondary forms of control. For example, one can expect
females, as a dominated group, to develop a lower sense of
personal control than males, as well as some forms of
secondary control: Hence the classical gender difference
on instrumental versus relational orientations, individual
versus collective identity (see Lorenzi-cioldi, 1988).
In the case of a temporary exposure to powerlessness,
people should experience a threat resulting in a decrease
of the feeling of personal control. This may seem to be a
truism as I defined power in terms of outcomes control.
However, it opens new perspectives and numerous hypotheses
about the issue of powerlessness. Given the need to feel
in control, the question of power becomes: How do the
powerless cope with a loss of control and restore a sense
of control in a specific situation? If the power relation
cannot be challenged, one way may be to try to influence or
adapt to the ones in power, in an attempt to get indirect
control over one's outcomes. But this would probably
require forming an accurate impression of the powerful
persons, to be able to predict their behavior.
CHAPTER 4
IMPRESSION FORMATION, CONTROL, AND POWER
impression Formation and Tn-h^rdenP,nH^n^o
How do people form impressions of powerful others?
The general question of impression formation processes is
clearly a core question for the understanding of social
interactions. Classically, social cognition theorists have
stressed the importance of category-based cognitive
schemata, i.e. stereotypes, in impression formation (for a
review, see Fiske and Taylor, 1991, Chapters 4 and 5). it
has been suggested that, because people have limited
cognitive capacity, they first tend to categorize targets
according to available labels, and then rely heavily on the
cognitive schemata, thereby activated, while forming an
impression. Indeed, stereotypes have been shown to bias
information processing at levels of encoding, memory, as
well as inferences. For example, when asked to form an
impression of another person, people attend more to
information that is consistent with their stereotypical
expectations.
In the last decade, however, researchers have been
more and more interested in motivational factors that
influence cognitive processes, picturing the human
processor more as a "motivated tactician" than a "cognitive
miser". In this line, Fiske and Neuberg (1990), have
17
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proposed a continuum model of impression formation: They
suggested that, although category-based impressions are the
default option, people can move towards more individuating
processes when motivated to do so. Among those motivating
factors, control motivation has been given particular
importance. Much data have indeed suggested that in
situations of interdependence, i.e. when target and
perceiver's outcomes are under joint control, perceivers
tend to form more individuated impressions of the target
(Berscheid et al., 1976; Erber and Fiske, 1984; Fiske and
Von Hendy, in press; Neuberg and Fiske, 1987; Ruscher and
Fiske, 1990). Under conditions of outcome dependency, the
perceivers pay more attention to the target's attributes,
especially to those attributes that are inconsistent with
category-based expectations. They also make more
dispositional inferences about the target and tend to form
more complex impressions. These results were interpreted
in terms of control motivation: When one's outcomes are
controlled, in part, by another person, one will pay
particular attention to that person's attributes
(especially the inconsistent ones as they are potentially
more informative) in an effort to regain control. In other
words, research on impression formation and interdependence
has suggested that, given a need for control,
interdependence-induced control deprivation will result in
more individuating impression formation processes. This
19
interpretation, however, raises some issues related to the
kind of interdependence that researchers have considered:
symmetrical interpersonal interdependence.
Impression Format ion and Powo
.r Re1ai-ir>n
Most research has indeed dealt with cooperative
interdependence, in which perceiver and target's outcomes
were positively correlated (e.g., Erber and Fiske, 1984;
Neuberg and Fiske, 1987). It can then be argued that the
issue of outcomes control is confounded with phenomena of
unit formation or ingroup categorization, which could be
responsible for the individuating effect. Some research
investigating competitive interdependence, in which
perceiver and target's outcomes are negatively correlated,
has, however, confirmed the individuating effect of
interdependence (Ruscher and Fiske, 1990) . Yet, to my
mind, it is still difficult to ascertain that the
individuating effect is due to the control manipulation in
itself. Some sort of unit formation cannot be totally
overruled as long as research is restricted to symmetrical
interdependence. Both target and perceiver had equal
control over the outcomes and were assigned the same role:
The target may well have been perceived as a kind of
teammate in the situation. A further test of the continuum
model of impression formation would then be to manipulate
directly the amount of control the target has over the
20
perceiver's outcomes in a non-reciprocal situation, i.e. in
a situation of power relation.
Remember that power relations, as I defined them, are
characterized by role differentiation and outcome
dependency: A has control over B's outcomes, but not the
other way around. The amount of power of A is defined by
the amount of control A has over B's outcomes, if control
motivation is responsible for individuating processes in
impression formation we would expect that: (a) The more
the target has power over the perceiver, the more the
perceiver will experience a loss of personal control (b)
This will result in a more individuating impression of the
target (more attention to inconsistent information, more
dispositional inferences)
. These predictions would be
consistent with data suggesting that people have well-
developed schemata for those in power (Rush and Russell,
1988; Sande et al., 1986).
Another question that arises from research on
impression formation is the one of interpersonal versus
intergroup situations. Indeed, most of the research has
dealt with interpersonal interdependence, suggesting an
individuating effect of both interpersonal cooperation and
competition. I have just suggested that the individuating
effect should also appear in powerless perceivers as a
function of targets' power. But would this effect appear
in intergroup situations? With observing natural
21
Situations, it is doubtful that ingroup members will
individualize members of an outgroup competing or having
power over them. Available data would rather suggest that
intergroup competition leads to stereotyping (Sherif et
alw 1961). in a recent study, Ruscher and her colleagues
(Ruscher et al., in press) have investigated impression
formation in interpersonal versus intergroup competition.
In the interpersonal condition, subjects were competing on
a one-to-one basis, while in the intergroup condition, they
were cooperating with ingroup members and competing against
outgroup members. Results showed that subjects
individualized the opponents in the interpersonal situation
but not in the intergroup situation. in the latter,
subjects were shown to individualize ingroup members. This
individualization of ingroup members was proposed as an
explanation for the lack of individualization of outgroup
members: Attention to ingroup members would have drained
subjects' limited attentional resources. To test this
interpretation, it would be necessary to manipulate the
intergroup/interpersonal dimension in a way that could
control for the impact of ingroup members on subjects.
Such a paradigm is available in the intergroup relations
litterature.
Intergroup theorists have suggested that group
behaviors can be elicited in minimal conditions, without
any kind of interdependence or interaction between group
22
members (Tajfel et al., 1971). The mere fact of
categorizing subjects into groups, without people knowing
or seeing each other is sufficient to induce ingroup bias
(Brewer, 1979). The important variable is then purely
cognitive, in terms of self
-categorization (Turner et al.,
1987); every human interaction can then be conceptualized
on a continuum from interpersonal relations (acting in
terms of personal identity) to intergroup relations (acting
in terms of social identity; Tajfel, 1978). m order to
activate the "Us versus Them" dimension, one can manipulate
the cognitive salience of a categorization, in perceptual
terms, a stimulus is salient, grabs the attention, when it
stands out in the context (Taylor and Fiske, 1978) . In
self-categorization terms, a categorization is salient when
it maximizes intergroup differences an intragroup
similarities (Oakes, 1987). For example, if l belong to
group of females and the other group is made of males, the
males-versus-females categorization is cognitively salient,
or relevant. But if I belong to a group of females and the
other group is made of both males and females, the males-
versus-females categorization is less salient. In other
words, by manipulating the homogeneity of the outgroup, one
can make a categorization more or less salient and elicit
more interpersonal or intergroup behaviors.
I shall therefore investigate the
interpersonal/intergroup dimension, by manipulating the
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perceived homogeneity of the outgroup, in a minimal group
situation (no interdependence or interaction)
. Outgroup
members would either belong to one category (homogeneous
condition) or to different categories (heterogeneous
condition)
.
I expect that ial m the heterogeneous
condition, in which the outgroup are perceived as
individuals, so the interaction is interpersonal, outgroup
power will have the individuating effect that I predicted
for interindividual situations Ibl m the homogeneous
condition, in which the outgroup are perceived as a group,
so the interaction is intergroup, outgroup power will not
lead to individuation. Indeed, when the ones in power are
perceived as a collection of individuals, a good strategy
to gain indirect control over one's outcomes may be to pay
particular attention in order to adapt one's behavior and
influence the powerful persons. However, when the ones in
power are perceived as an outgroup, such strategy may not
be chosen because outgroups are expected to discriminate
against the ingroup (Leyens and Schadron, 1980) and
outgroups members are perceived as strongly committed to
their own group norms and therefore more difficult to
influence (Horwitz and Rabbie, 1982).
Altogether, these hypotheses provide further test of
the predictions of the continuum model of impression
formation related to control motivation. They also suggest
how perceived power differentials could affect the
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powerless, and one of the ways the powerless may cope with
a loss of personal control.
CHAPTER 5
THE EXPERIMENT
Overview
The following experiment manipulated perceived
outgroup power and homogeneity, in a minimal group
situation. Subjects, run individually in the lab, believed
they would have to perform a concentration task together
with other subjects. They also believed that a group of
distractors would have more or less power over them, and
would be either homogeneous (people from one category) or
heterogenous (people from different categories)
. I
expected subjects to report feeling less in control in the
high power than low power condition. I also expected that
this loss of control would lead to individuating
impressions of the distractors in the heterogeneous
condition (more attention to information that is
inconsistent with stereotypical expectations, more
dispositional inferences) but that this effect would not
appear in the homogeneous condition (if anything the
reverse is expected, i.e. more stereotypic impressions) .
Method
Stimulus Material
Two pre-tests were conducted in order to choose the
social categories and their associated stereotypes to be
used in the experiment. The aim was to select a set of
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traits that would be relevant to two different categories
(the traits perceived as consistent with the first category
being perceived as inconsistent with the second, and the
other way around) so that the category membership of the
target of the impression could be counterbalanced in the
experimental design. I decided to investigate the
stereotypes held by psychology students about students
having other college majors, as categories of relevance to
students
.
In a first step, 200 psychology students were asked to
select, from a list of 109 personality traits, the most
typical traits associated with 20 different college majors
(for each major, n=50)
.
On the basis of the frequencies of
the traits selected for each major, four pairs of majors
displaying clear and opposite stereotypes were chosen
(i.e., Art/Business, Art/Mathematics, Business/Physical
Education, Mathematics/Physical Education)
. For each pair,
inconsistent traits were generated and added to the list of
consistent traits.
In a second step, 80 psychology students rated the
consistency/inconsistency of the traits, for both majors of
each pair, on seven point Likert scales (for each pair,
n=20)
.
The pair Art/Mathematics was chosen as showing the
clearest and most opposite stereotypes. From the ratings,
a list of eight traits was constituted such as four traits
were perceived as consistent with Art but inconsistent with
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Mathematics, and four other traits were perceived as
consistent with Mathematics but inconsistent with Art (see
Table 1)
.
From these eight traits, eight short sentences of
self
-description were generated. These sentences were
constructed so that no information would be added to the
traits, for example, for logical: "i try to be very
logical in all I do." The number of words in the four
sentences consistent with Art and in the four sentences
consistent with Math was identical. The eight sentences,
handwritten in an androgenous style on different sheets of
paper, constituted the stimulus materials for the
impression formation (see APPENDIX A)
.
Research Design
The experiment used a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with
Outgroup Power (low, high)
,
Outgroup Homogeneity (low,
high) and Target's Category (math, art) as between-subjects
variables. Target's Category was included in the design as
a counterbalancing variable.
Subjects
The subjects were 99 undergraduate psychology majors
(37 males, 62 females) . They were randomly assigned to
each of the conditions created by the between-subjects
variables, with approximately the same proportion of males
and females per condition. Subjects were contacted by
phone and asked to participate a group experiment
Table 1. Stimulus materials: Ratings of
consistency/inconsistency for Art and Math majors
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Art Major Math manor
M t(19) n M i:(i9) P
Creative +2.80 30.0
. 000 -1.35
*t . JL
Emotional +2 3 5 j.^ . \i
. UUO
-1.20 4.7 .000
Individualistic +2.35 10.6 .000
-0.80 3.4 .003
Impulsive +1.95 8.7 .000
-1.20 4.7 .000
Studious
-1. 15 3.8 .001 +2.65 24.2 .000
Logical
-0.80 4.0 .001 +2.55 15.0 .000
Traditional
-1.50 6.4 .000 +1.60 6.8 .000
Conventional
-1.50 4.8 .000 +1.55 5.3 .000
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entitled "How to study at home with noisy housemates", in
exchange for one extra credit toward their course grade.
The experimenter explained on the phone that the aim of the
experiment was to measure students' ability to concentrate
in a distracting environment, while trying to arrange an
appointment, the experimenter insisted on the necessity to
find a time which would be convenient for all five
subjects. It was also stressed that, because it was a
group experiment, it was important to be on time for the
appointment. The experiment would last approximately 4 0
minutes
.
Procedure
Subjects were run individually as described in this
section. When introduced into the laboratory, the subject
could see a row of five empty chairs, with numbers from one
to five. Facing these chairs was another set of three
chairs with androgenous coats and back-packs on them. The
experimenter explained that, because of a last minute
inconvenience (one of the five subjects could not arrive on
time)
,
he had to postpone the experiment for half-an-hour
.
Although he could get in touch with the three other
subjects, he apologized for not having had enough time to
advise her of this change. The experimenter also explained
that, because of a meeting afterwards, he could not stay
longer than originally planned and would therefore have to
make the experiment shorter. The experiment was supposedly
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composed of two phases: In a preparation phase, lasting
about 20 minutes, subjects would be asked to fill out some
questionnaires, in a second phase, lasting 20 minutes too,
the group experiment itself would be taking place. Because
the experiment would start later today, the questionnaire
part would be skipped. The experimenter proposed however
to the subject to do the questionnaire part while waiting
for the others to arrive. All subjects accepted this
proposition. After checking on a list, the experimenter
told the subject she was subject #3 in today's group and
invited her to sit in chair #3. Under this chair was
hidden a microphone, connected to a tape recorder which was
concealed in another part of the room.
Experimental manipulation
Once the subject was seated, the experimenter said he
would first briefly describe the experiment that was to
take place half an hour later. An instruction sheet,
describing the experimental manipulations, was handed out
to the subject and read aloud by the experimenter (see
APPENDIX B) . The experiment was described as a test of
concentration abilities in a distracting environment.
Subjects, five psychology majors, would have to complete a
task requiring concentration (writing down multiples of
three, as fast as possible and without mistakes) and would
be rewarded as a function of their performance (the final
number they would have reached after 20 minutes) . Facing
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them would sit three other students playing the role of
"distractors". The experimenter explained that the
distractors had already arrived (hence the coats on the
chairs) and were currently being briefed about their role
in another room. m the Low Power condition, the
distractors were supposed to "speak loudly to each other in
order to distract you from your work", m the High Power
condition, they would "do whatever they want (except
touching you) in order to distract you from your work. They
will also watch you and each time they think you have been
distracted, even slightly, they will make you start again
from scratch". The subject was told that, in order to
avoid the distractors knowing them and being biased, the
distractors had not been recruited among psychology
students. In the Low Homogeneity condition, the
experimenter said: "Actually, one is a Math major, another
an Art major and the third a Business major" (for the Math
Target condition) or "Actually, one is an Art major,
another a Math major and the third a Business major" (for
the Art Target condition) . In the High Homogeneity
condition he said: "Actually, they are Math majors" (for
the Math Target condition) or "Actually they are Art
majors" (for the Art Target condition)
.
Dependent Measures
Emotions and Control . After having read the
instructions, the experimenter asked the subject to fill
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assess
see
out a first questionnaire concerning "What is your current
mood right now, and what do you think your concentrati<
abilities are?" This was justified by explaining that
maybe concentration performances can be affected by the
mood people are in. The questions were designed to
subject's emotional reactions and feeling of control (s<
APPENDIX C)
.
Attention TimP
. After the first questionnaire was
filled out, the experimenter explained that in a natural
situation, such as working at home with noisy housemates,
people usually know the persons by whom they are being
distracted. In the present situation, however, subjects
would not know the distractors at all. Out of a concern
for realism, the experimenter wanted, therefore, the
subjects to have an idea of who the distractors were before
the concentration test starts. But at the same time the
experimenter did not want subjects and distractors to meet
each other before the test because this could have biased
the distractors. This explanation justified the fact that
the distractors had been asked to describe themselves prior
to the experiment and that this information was shown to
the subject. It was explained that, to make the task
easier for the distractors, they had been presented with a
list of personality traits on different sheets of paper and
asked to select the traits that best fit them as well as
write a brief sentence of self-description for each trait.
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At this point, a folder containing our stimulus material
and marked "Distractor #1, Major: Math" or "Distractor #i.
Major: Art" was presented to the subject. The eight pages
(the four consistent and four inconsistent information)
contained in the folder were placed in a random order. The
subject was specifically asked to "study these traits and
try to form an impression of the first distractor." The
subject was also asked to read the material aloud so that
the experimenter could verify that the subject understood
the hand-writing of this distractor. This would be used,
in fact, for the coding of the attention time to consistent
and inconsistent information. Indeed, while he was getting
the folder with the traits, the experimenter also turned on
the hidden tape recorder that would record the sound of the
pages being turned as well as the voice of the subject and
provide a measure of the time spent studying each piece of
information.
Dispositional Inferences and Impression Formed . Once
tiie previous task was completed, the experimenter explained
that the concentration test would be run several times with
different group of subjects, but he was not sure whether to
keep the same distractors or not. For that reason, it was
interesting for him to know what kind of impact these
distractors have on people. Specifically, the subject was
asked to give first impressions of the first distractor, by
answering a second questionnaire. It was made clear that
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the answers would be kept confidential. These questi
were designed to assess the dispositional inference
subjects would make about the target, as well as th
quality of the impression formed in terms of positivity a
typicality (see APPENDIX D)
.
Once the last questionnaire was filled out,
approximately 30 minutes had passed since the subject was
first introduced into the lab. The procedure of impression
formation did not go on for the other distractors, nor did
the "concentration test". Rather, the experimenter,
checking his watch, proposed to interrupt the procedure
because the others should arrive at any moment. The
subject was first checked for suspicion and then carefully
debriefed. The subject was given extra credit and a
lottery was planned to distribute the money subjects could
have won according to the cover story. After being
debriefed for 15 minutes, no subjects showed signs of
resentment for having been deceived and all consented that
their data would be used for research purposes.
Variables Coding
Attention Time
One judge, blind to conditions, coded the time spent
by each subject on studying the four inconsistent and the
four consistent information. This was done, using a stop-
watch, from the sound of the turning pages recorded on the
audiotape. The coding resulted in a total attention time
for consistencies and a total attention time for
inconsistencies for each subject, should an anO^iguity
occur on the recorded material, the observation was coded
as missing data. This happened for 12 of the 99 subjects.
Also, for technical reasons, the recording was not
available for eight other subjects. Finally, the attention
time for inconsistent information of one subject, being
over three standard deviation from the mean, was deleted
from the analysis^
.Dispositional Tnferenr^pc;
For each subject, the number of inferred personality
traits was recorded. All in all, 86 traits had been
inferred in the Art target condition and 85 in the Math
target condition, resulting in a total of 144 different
traits. Nine judges (psychology students) were asked to
code these traits, using seven point Likert scales, on
three dimensions: typicality/atypicality for Math
students, typical ity/atypicality for Art students, general
positivity/negativity. Judgments were highly reliable,
(for all three combined, Alpha=.89). From these judgments,
the traits inferred by each subject could be coded as
typical, atypical or irrelevant to the target's category,
as well as positive, negative or neutral. For each
The data of five subjects for the second
questionnaire (impression formed), who had reported being
suspicious at this point of the experiment, were also
deleted from subsequent analyses.
subject, available data on dispositional inferences were-
Total nuMber of traits, number of typical, atypical and
irrelevant traits, number of positive, negative and neutral
traits
Results
Emotions and Control
subjects' answers to each question of the first
questionnaire were entered into an analysis of variance:
Outgroup Power (low, high), Outgroup Homogeneity (low,
high). Target's Category (art, math), Sex (male, female).
As predicted, Outgroup Power had a strong effect on
subjects' feeling of control (see Table 2): m the high
power condition subjects felt they had less personal
control over the outcomes [F(l, 83) =14 . 25, p=.000], and that
the distractors had more control [F(l, 79) =7 . 17
, p=.009].
They also felt they had lower concentration abilities
[F(l,83)=14.25, p=.000] and were less confident about doing
well at the test [F(l,83)=12.42, p=.001]2. Power did not
have an impact on reported emotions. However, subjects
reported feeling less tired, weary or unreactive in the
2 Interestingly, females' feeling of control was lower
than that of males: Personal control [F(l, 83) =4 . 43
,
p=.03],
Distractor's control [F(l, 79) =9 . 41, p=.003]. Ability[F(l,83)=3.71, p=.05]. Confidence [F(l, 83) =9 . 93
,
p=.002].
Table 2. Peelings of control as a function of outgroup
Personal control
Distractor's control
Self-confidence
Personal abilities
Outgroup Power
High
5.51 (n=47) 4.71 (n=51)
4.58 (n=50)
4.39 (n=51)
4.18 (n=51)
3.77 (n=44)
5.17 (n=47)
4.87 (n=47)
38
high homogeneity compared to low homogeneity condition
[F(l,82=4.70, p=.03]3.
Attention Time
scores Of attention to consistent and inconsistent
information were entered into a mixed model analysis of
variance (the previous between-subjects variables plus
information Type (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a repeated
measure)
.
As predicted, the analysis yielded a two-way
interaction between Outgroup Power and Information Type:
subjects paid more attention to consistent information in
the low power condition, but the opposite was true in the
high power condition [F(l, 70) =12
. 93
, p=.001].
I also predicted that Outgroup Power would increase
attention when homogeneity was low, but that this would not
happen when homogeneity was high: This interaction effect
was confirmed [F(l,70)=3.70, p=.05]. When attention to
consistencies and inconsistencies were entered into two
separate analyses of variance, no effect reached
significance for consistent information. For inconsistent
information, however, there was a main effect of Power
[F(l, 61) =5. 16, p=.02] and an interaction effect of Power by
Homogeneity [F (1 , 61=4 . 43 , p=.03]: Subjects increased their
Also, males reported feeling less calm, relaxed or
at ease when the target was an Art major, while females
reported the same but for Math major [F(l,83)=9.29,
p=.003].
attention to inconsistencies inx n m the high power condition,
but only When homogeneity was low (see Table 3 and 4).
Dispositional Inferences and Impression Formed
The different numbers of traits inferred by subjects
(total number, number of typical, atypical and irrelevant
number of positive, negative and neutral) were entered into
an analysis of variance, with the usual variables. As
predicted, the analysis yielded a two-way interaction
between Power and Homogeneity on the total number of traits
[F(l,73)=3.85, p=.05]. In line with the attention data,
subjects made more dispositional inferences in the high
power condition when homogeneity was Low, but the opposite
was true when homogeneity was high (see Table 5) .
interestingly, however, the power manipulation did not
affect the typicality of the traits inferred. Subjects
simply inferred more typical traits when homogeneity was
low [F(l,73)=5.60, p=.02], and more irrelevant traits when
homogeneity was high [F(l, 73) =4 . 65, p=.03].
The number of positive and negative traits were not
directly affected by the power manipulation^ However, a
significant interaction between Power and Homogeneity
occurred for neutral traits [F(l, 67)=8.44, p=.005]:
Subjects inferred more neutral traits in the high power
However, females inferred more positive traits than
males did [F(l, 73) =4 . 75, p=.031. Females also inferred more
negative traits in the high power condition while the
opposite was true for males [F(l,67)=6.21, p=.01].
Table 3. Attention to consistent informat-i or,i-cuu rormat n (m seconds)
Outgroup Power
Low High
o 4. 19.95 iROutgroup n^TQ ^^.15
Homogeneity ^=19 n=20
High 21.84 20 33
n=19 n=i8
seconds)*
"""^^^"^^^^ inconsistent information (in
Outgroup Power
Low High
Low 18.53 22 95Outgroup n=l9 n=20Homogeneity
High 20.53 20.72
n=19 n=18
Table 5. Dispositional inferences (number of traits
inferred)
Outgroup Power
Low High
Low 2.77 3.^4
Outgroup n=22 n=22
Homogeneity
High 3.00 2.33
n=20 n=24
condition When homogeneity was low, but the opposite was
true When homogeneity was high. Subjects- answers to the
second questionnaire were entered into an analysis of
variance with the usual variables. The power manipulation
did not affect the general impression that subjects
reported having formed^.
Discussion
The hypotheses were largely confirmed. Outgroup Power
clearly affected subjects' feeling of control. it
increased attention to the target, but only when the
outgroup was heterogeneous, i.e. was perceived as a
collection of individuals. it also led to more
dispositional inferences, but again, only when the outgroup
was heterogeneous. This suggests that, in order to regain
indirect outcome control, people would be motivated to pay
particular attention to the ones in power, as long as they
are perceived as a collection of individuals, but that this
strategy would not be chosen when the ones in power are
perceived as a homogeneous group. The lack of result on
the questions designed to tap emotional reactions and the
impression formed may have resulted from the measures being
too obvious and so suggests the use of non-obtrusive
measures. Along that line, the quality of dispositional
Females reported having formed a more positive
impression than males did [F(l, 75) =4 . 52
,
p=.03], and
subjects reported preferring in general Art majors to Math
majors [F(l, 61) =4 . 38
,
p=.04].
inferences was analv^f^H o,,^ • .yzed. Surprisingly, Outgroup Power did
not affect the typicality of the trait-c <r.^I
^
un u its inferred, although
subjects had paid more attention to inconsistent
attributes. Things happened as if, m order to restore
control, subjects would pay more attention to the most
informative attributes, but when asked to infer other
attributes, they would rely primarily on their category-
based schema. Outgroup Homogeneity did, however, affect
the quality of inferences: Subjects inferred more typical
traits when the outgroup was heterogeneous and more
irrelevant traits when the outgroup was homogeneous. This
can be explained by the fact that subjects anticipated
having to form an impression of the other distractors too,
which would require differentiating them from each other.
Finally, the fact that subjects inferred more neutral
traits in the High Power/Low Homogeneity condition,
suggests that having paid more attention, subjects would
form a less extreme impression of the target, which is
consistent with the extremity-complexity hypothesis
(Linville, 1982)
.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
I Started the present thesis by asking what are the
psychological impacts of perceived power differentials fro.
the perspective of the powerless. Review of the social
psychological literature on power indicated that the
problem did not receive the attention it deserves, i
suggested that one reason for this lacuna may be a confused
definition of the concept. Power should be distinguished
from social influence or social status and may be defined
in terms of outcome control in a non-reciprocal situation.
As a theoretical basis, the literature on psychological
control led to considering the control of one's own
outcomes as an important human motivation. The question of
power became: how the powerless will cope with a threat to
their sense of control?
One answer came from the literature on impression
formation. The continuum model, developed by Fiske and her
colleagues, postulates that people can be motivated to go
beyond initial stereotypes when the target of the
impression has some control over their outcomes. In other
words, people will pay particular attention to the ones who
control their outcomes in an effort to restore a feeling of
control. This individuating effect was verified in
situations of joint control over the outcomes, i.e.
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cooperative and competitive interpersonal interdepenaence.
vet, a strong test of the „odel would be to manipulate the
amount of control the target has over the perceiver-s
outcomes in a non-reciprocal situation, i.e. a situation of
power relation. Furthermore, if the crucial variable is
control, the individuating effect, previously mentioned.
Should apply as well to situations of intergroup relations,
some research suggested it does not, as in intergroup
situations the best strategy to gain control over one's
outcomes would be to nav 4.u :o p y attention to mgroup members with
whom one cooperates. To control for this effect, I
proposed to use a minimal group situation, such as
described by Tajfel and his colleagues, and manipulate the
cognitive salience of the intergroup dimension.
This first experiment investigated the effect of
outgroup power and outgroup homogeneity (the categorization
salience manipulation) on impression formation processes.
Results showed that the power manipulation affected
subjects' feeling of control, and led to more individuation
of the target, but only when the ones in power were
perceived as a collection of individuals (heterogeneous
condition)
.
This suggests that control motivation may
indeed cause individuation in interpersonal relations.
Interesting results suggested that, although control
deprivation led to more attention to atypical traits and
dispositional inferences, these inferences remained largely
based on stereotypical expectations. Maybe a loss of
control induces a general activation of information
processing, leading to increased attention to both
environmental information (the actual traits) ^ cognitive
information (the schema-based traits) 7 a striking result
was that the power manipulation did not lead to
individuation when the ones in power were perceived as a
salient outgroup (homogeneous condition)
, although
subjects, sense of control was affected. Outgroup members
are usually perceived as committed to group norms and
therefore more difficult to influence than distinct
individuals. The perceived opportunity to influence the
ones in power, in order to gain indirect control over one's
outcomes, may then be a crucial intermediate variable
between loss of control and individuation. Obviously, many
hypotheses about the relation between control and
impression formation in interpersonal and intergroup
cooperation, competition, and power relation remain to be
tested.
Let us come back to the question of the psychological
consequences of perceived power differentials for the
powerless, and more specifically to the question of how
the powerless form an impression of the powerful. Do
people individualize the ones in power or not? Well, it
depends. Data suggest that power leads to individuation
when it is perceived as belonging to individuals, but not
When it is perceived as belonging to an outgroup. This
differential impact of social power, depending on how power
IS categorized, opens interesting questions, m
particular, ™any hypotheses on intergroup relations and
social identity theory could be tested by proposing that
the group one identifies with contributes to one-s sense of
control. How does group power affect personal control?
How does perceived power affect group identification?
Results from a first follow-up study, manipulating power
categorization in a natural environment are currently being
analyzed.
I believe that investigating the strategies by which
people cope with a loss of control offers fascinating
perspectives for the understanding of social change
processes. After all, what is politics but a discourse on
power and its social partition?
APPENDIX A
STIMULUS MATERIAL
Studious: I think of myself as being very studious
Logical: I try to be very logical in all i do
Traditional: People say that I seem very traditional
conventional: I find I can be conventional sometimes
Consistent with Art Major and Tnnnn.^.^ent with M.i-ho^.^^
Creative: I have always chosen a creative way of living
Individualistic: I tend to be more of an individualistic
person
Emotional: I guess I am considered an emotional person
Impulsive: I realize I am a bit impulsive
cs
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
Instructions fn>- High Pnwe^r- u^ " qn Hnwer High Homoaf^n^jtv Cnnriii-io..
It is very important for students to be able to
concentrate for long periods of time and study in
distracting environments, like when you have to work at
home and your housemates are distracting you. This is the
situation we want to reproduce here today.
This experiment is part of a vast study aiming at
testing and comparing the concentration abilities of
different college students. The group of subjects we want
to test today are
Your task, together with the other subjects, will be
to write down numbers starting from zero and adding three
each time (that is: 0, 3, 6, 9, 12,...) for 20 minutes.
You should do this as fast as possible, and without
mistakes, because the number you will have reached, after
20 minutes, will be the number of cents you will earn in
the experiment (for example, if you go up to number 2 000
without mistakes, you will get $20).
However, in order to reproduce a distracting
environment, we have hired a group a students, lets call
them the distractors, who will sit in front of you and do
whatever they want (except touch you) in order to distract
you from your work. You should try not to pay any
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attention and remain conof^n+-
^
m ncentrated on your work because the
you have been distracted, even slightly, they will make you
start again from scratch.
The three distractors have been recruited in another
UMass department than the subjects Thi.. kw eci^ . is IS because we do
not want them to know you. Actually, they are
It is very important for students to be able to
concentrate for long periods of time and study in
distracting environments, like when you have to work at
home and your housemates are distracting you. This is the
situation we want to reproduce here today.
This experiment is part of a vast study aiming at
testing and comparing the concentration abilities of
different college students. The group of subjects we want
to test today are
Your task, together with the other subjects, will be
to write down numbers starting from zero and adding three
each time (that is: 0, 3, 6, 9, 12,...) for 20 minutes.
You should do this as fast as possible, and without
mistakes, because the number you will have reached, after
20 minutes, will be the number of cents you will earn in
the experiment (for example, if you go up to number 2000,
without mistakes, you will get $20)
.
However, in order to reproduce e. distracting
environment, „e have hired a group a students, lets call
the» the distractors, who win sit in front of you and
speak loudly with each other in order to distract you fro„
your work. Vou should try not to pay any attention and
remain concentrated on your work.
The three distractors have been recruited in other
UMass departments than the subjects. This is because we do
not want them to know you. Actually one is a
the other a and the third a
FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE
Please inaioate how you feel right now by giving a score
(using this scale: (not at all, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very
much,, to each of the following groups of emotions:
- happy, cheerful, or joyous
- angry, irritated, or annoyed
- unhappy, sad, or gloomy
- frightened, worried, or threatened
- energetic, aroused, or keyed-up
- tired, weary, or unreactive
- jittery, shaky, or nervous
- calm, relaxed, or at-ease
- enthusiastic, alive, or alert
Would you say that your concentration abilities are:
not very
^^^^
9°°^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 good
How confident are you about doing well in this experiment ?
not very
^e^^y
confident 12 3 4 5 6 7 confident
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How much control do von f^^i .a y u feel you will have over your
outcomes in this experiment ?
very little
control 12345 a lot of
6 7 control
How much control do vou fp<=i ^- ^y eel the distractors will have over
your outcomes in this experiment ?
very little
a lot of
control 12 3 4 5 6 7 control
HOW hard do you expect the distractors to try to disturb
you ?
not very
excessively
^"^^ 12 3 4 5 6 7 hard
would you like, in a second step, the roles to be reversed,
that is your group to become distractors and the
distractors to become subjects ?
not at
very
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 much
APPENDIX D
SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE
-
HOW Clear is your impression of this distractor ?
very
very
unclear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 clear
-
HOW positive is your impression of this distractor ?
not very
very
positive 1 2 3 4 5 6 ^^ ° V positive
-
HOW do you feel about having this person as one of the
distractors ?
rather
very
unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 happy
- According to you what other personality traits may
characterize this person ?
53
How typical of <=+-„ri^«4. ^students do you think this
person is ?
very
atypical 1 2 3 4 5
very
6 7 typical
- How much do you like 4. ^ ^
^ students in general ?
not very
very
* ^ 6 7 much
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